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While Professor Arthur Larson is not the first to examine the legal
ramifications of unfair employment practices in general, or even to focus on
sex discrimination in particular, his two-volume treatise, Employment Discrimination, promises to achieve a well-deserved reputation in both of these
areas. For Employment Discrimination is a treatise in every sense of the
word. The person who is unfamiliar with either the theoretical or procedural
aspects of sex discrimination laws will profit immensely by reading both
volumes from cover to cover. Through an extensive use of hypotheticals and
examples, Professor Larson seems to come right out of the pages to conduct
a course on employment discrimination, far beyond the introductory level.
The practitioner who specializes in this area will also find Employment
Discriminationto be an invaluable research tool. Both the table of contents
and the index are surprisingly functional-especially in comparison to other
works of this scope. The appendices, which include pertinent statutes,
regulations and legislative histories, as well as the section containing forms,
help to make the treatise a truly self-contained body of knowledge. With
anticipated periodic supplements, Employment Discriminationwill continue
to provide the means for quickly locating anything from the latest district
court decision on an arcane procedural point to the current weight of
authority on the legality of a particular employment practice. Moreover, the
practitioner, who must advise clients as well as litigate for them, will find
Professor Larson's interpretations of the many unsettled aspects of sex
discrimination law to be extremely enlightening and persuasive to judges
considering a question of first impression.
I.
The emphasis in volume 1 is on the interplay among the various
sources of sex discrimination laws vis-a-vis those activities, particularly
those of employers, which the laws scrutinize. In chapter 1, Professor
Larson traces the history of the American legal system's approach to the
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phenomenon of women in the labor force-from its treatment of women as
legal non-entities through the contemplated Equal Rights Amendment of
today. '
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 of course, is the most significant congressional effort in this area, and much of the treatise is devoted to
it. 3 Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers against employees or
applicants on the basis of sex, in hiring or firing, compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, and generally in limiting, segregating or classifying employees. 4 Chapter 2 of Employment Discrimination
summarizes Title VII, as well as the various other federal and state laws
which deal with sex discrimination.
While "discrimination" is an obvious element of a Title VII violation,
Professor Larson points out the conceptual problems encountered by courts
and the EEOC through an overuse of this term. Strictly speaking, discrimination is legal whenever sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification" for
a particular job.5 Confusion arises when the same word is used to describe
both the legal and the unlawful variety. In order to do away with this
confusion, the author has formulated a two-step approach to be used when
analyzing a sex discrimination problem. This approach, together with
numerous examples of its application, is set out in chapters 3 and 4. At the
outset, it is necessary to determine whether the employer has differentiated
on the basis of sex. Sex differentiation occurs when being either male or
female is specifically made a condition affecting employment, or when a
requirement is imposed which demonstrably affects the great majority of the
members of one sex in an adverse manner. Since differentiation is not
necessarily illegal, however, a second step is required under Larson's
approach. This second step entails a determination as to whether the differentiation is justifiable under one of the statutory exceptions-usually the
"bona fide occupational qualification" exception. A finding of unlawful
discrimination will only result when the sex differentiation is not reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business or enterprise.
1. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment provides in part:
1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United

States or by any State on account of sex.
2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the

provisions of this article.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972). The amendment, not having been

ratified by the requisite number of states, is not yet in effect.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
3. Also given extensive treatment are the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(c)(4)

(1970), the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970), the post-Civil War
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and such quasi-statutory equal employment provisions as Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974), and Exec. Order No. 11,478,3 C.F.R. §
207 (1974).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
5. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
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In applying his two-step approach to the various forms of employment
practices, Professor Larson frequently takes issue with the announced
reasoning of the EEOC and the courts. An example of what most observers
would label faulty reasoning can be seen in Rafford v. Randle Eastern
Ambulance Service, Inc. 6 The male plaintiffs in Rafford were fired for
refusing to remove their beards and moustaches. In holding that this was not
sex discrimination under Title VII, the district court stated that "[t]he
discharge of pregnant women or bearded men does not violate the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 simply because only women become pregnant and only
men grow beards." 7 Larson attacks such reasoning by postulating that an
employer in a large factory which decreed that all "persons" with beards or
all pregnant "persons" shall be fired would certainly be found to have
differentiated on the basis of sex. 8 Since restrictions on beards are generally
justified under reasonable grooming standards, 9 the Rafford court probably
reached the correct result. By failing to make a clear distinction between
what is sex differentiation and what differentiation is justifiable, however,
the court focused on the wrong issues. The Larson two-step approach
invariably leads to the correct result, and, more importantly, avoids the
danger that potentially meritorious claims will be prematurely cut off by a
failure to consider the right issue, e.g., the reasonableness of the grooming
standard.
Another recurring theme of volume 1, emphasized in chapter 5, is the
treatment afforded to "protective laws," applicable only to female workers,
which were enacted in a large number of jurisdictions and purport to restrict
hours of work, night work, and heavy lifting. The protective laws, which
proceed upon the now-discarded assumption that women are inherently
"weaker" than males, are generally viewed today as impediments to equal
employment opportunity rather than vehicles for protecting women. Profes-'
sor Larson agrees with the current majority view that state protective laws
are invalid"0 under the doctrine of federal supremacy, at least to the extent
that they interfere with the objectives of Title VII.1 The most significant
practical ramification of federal supremacy is that an employer cannot
establish a bona fide occupational qualification exception by claiming that
6. 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (discussed in 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §
12.12).
7. 348 F. Supp. at 320.
8. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 12.12, at 3-21.
9. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1975), rev'g en banc 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d
895 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan v.
National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 19.00.
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the sex differentiation in question is required under state law. 12 While this
result is justified as long as employers can predict that the state law will be
declared invalid, inequity can result if the supremacy rationale is not
consistently followed by the Commission and the courts. For this reason,
Professor Larson prefers a clean-cut supremacy approach to the various
compromise solutions which are sometimes utilized.' 3
This preference runs even to the superficially appealing doctrine of
extension. Under the extension doctrine, any special concessions which are
made to female workers by state laws must also be granted to men in order
to achieve the equality in treatment required by Title VII. The author points
out that extension is clearly inapplicable in a large number of situations. For
example, a state law which forbids women from working in coal mines
would force all mines to shut down under a literal interpretation of the
extension doctrine, since neither men nor women could engage in this type
of work. 4 Equality between the sexes would be achieved, but at great cost
to employers as well as to society. Even when extension would not lead to
such exaggerated results, however, Professor Larson argues convincingly
that the doctrine should not be applied. For example, some states require
that female workers be given a ten-minute rest period every four hours.15
Should the law be deemed preempted, or should the rest periods be extended
to males in order to avoid a conflict with Title VII? Larson comes down
strongly in favor of preemption:
The point needs emphasis because some commentators, with the
best interests of working people at heart, all too readily welcome this
unexpected bonus in the form of more generous provision of such
things as rest periods, seating facilities, and lunch breaks. But the
issue, of course, is not whether it would be a generally good thing for
men to have more rest periods as well as women. The question is
whether this result was intended by either legislature. It was not intended by the federal Congress; nothing could have been further from
the collective consciousness of Congress at the time of enacting Title
VII than forcing employers to increase the number of rest periods of
their male employees. Nor was it intended by the state legislatures; if
they had wanted to compel more rest periods for male workers they
would have said so. Indeed, the omission is the clearest possible state12. See, e.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971), affl'd,
480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
13. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 20.00-21.00.

14. Although many state laws prohibiting the employment of women in coal mines have
been repealed in recent years, a few states retain provisions of this type. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §
52-612 (1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4107.43 (Page 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 701-299.1

(Purdon 1966).
15. A number of states require rest periods and/or lunch periods for women, but not for
men. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.365 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§

23-332-33 (West 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 107 (Purdon 1976-77 Supp.).
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ment that the legislature consciously elected not to mandate such rest
periods for men.16

Since, even at its best, extension produces undesirable results, the doctrine
should be abandoned except where specifically provided for by the federal
17
statute.
Some of the more interesting recent developments in sex discrimination
law have been in the area of health and welfare benefits for pregnant
employees. This topic, in addition to other benefits, privileges and conditions of employment, is treated extensively in chapter 8. Professor Larson
has taken a position contrary to that of the EEOC and six federal courts of
appeals on the question of whether employment-connected health and welfare plans which exclude pregnancy from coverage are violative of Title
VII. 18 His views were confirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,19 which held that a private employer may
exclude pregnancy and related disabilities from coverage under a sickness
and accident plan without violating Title VII.
The final chapter in volume 1 examines the specialty area of labor
union responsibility under the various sex discrimination laws. This examination runs the gamut from a union's duty of fair representation under the
Labor-Management Relations Act 20 to direct discrimination and union liability for damages under the Equal Pay Act. 2 '
II.
Volume 2 considers the broad areas of procedure and remedies. The
procedures which aggrieved parties and counsel must follow in order to have
a discrimination claim adjudicated by the EEOC or a court are treated in
chapter 10. Once again, this treatment includes not only Title VII claims but
actions under state laws, the Equal Pay Act and section 1983 as well. A
16. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 21.00, at 5-33 to 5-34 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original); see Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
17. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 21.00, at 5-35. Extension applies under the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 because of the following section of the Fair Labor Standards Act, of which the
Equal Pay Act is a part:

No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance
with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage
higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter ....
29 U.S.C. § 218 (1970); see 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 21.00, at 5-36 to 5-38. The Equal
Pay Act is treated extensively in chapter 7.
18. See I EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 38.21, at 8-39 to 8-40.
19. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). A number of state courts have held that health and welfare plans
which exclude pregnancy benefits violate state fair employment practice laws. See, e.g., Cedar
Rapids Community School Dist. v. Parr, - Iowa -, 227 N.W.2d 486 (1975); Brooklyn Union
Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393 (1976);
Ray-O-Vac, Div. of E.S.B., Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 70
Wis. 2d 919, 236 N.W.2d 209 (1975).

20. 29 U.S.C. 88 141 et seq. (1970).
21.

Id. § 206(d).
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thorough examination of the myriad remedies which a court has at its
disposal once an employment practice is found to be illegal is undertaken by
Professor Larson in chapter 11. Volume 2 contains the "nuts and bolts" of
what a practitioner must know in order to handle a sex discrimination
case-joinder of parties, election of remedies, etc. These procedural questions are exhaustively treated with respect to all forms of prohibited discrimination (not sex alone).
Even though the subject matter of Volume 2 is inherently less conducive
to scholarly commentary, Professor Larson succeeds in providing
appropriate theoretical discussion where necessary to clarify areas of confusion or uncertainty. One such area is that relating to proof of discrimination,
particularly in cases involving professional or academic employees. The
disproportionate male dominance of top executive, professional, and university faculty jobs is well documented, and lawsuits pursuant to Title VII are
becoming more and more common in reaction to this particular form of sex
discrimination. Under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,22 the qualifications required for a
given job are an important part of the private litigant's prima facie case in a
Title VII action. As Larson observes, however, "how do you state objectively the qualifications of a lawyer to be hired by Sullivan and Cromwell? It
is not enough to say that he or she 'is a qualified lawyer,'

.

.

. [since] not

every qualified lawyer. . . can meet the standards [which] this firm has set
for itself.'
Professor Larson's suggested solution to this problem is but
one example of his many contributions, seen throughout the treatise, to the
field of sex discrimination law. The right of a professional to bring a Title
VII action within the framework of the McDonnell Douglas formula is
reconciled with the right of the employer to set high standards for determining which professionals will be hired or promoted.
The plaintiff in a sex discrimination case, after identifying herself as a
member of a class protected under Title VII, must proceed to establish her
qualifications for the job or position for which she applied. In the professional and academic areas, however, the only issue should be what those
qualifications are-not what they ought to be. As Professor Larson points
out, "[t]he Budapest String Quartet, is entitled to have more rigorous
standards than the Clayborn College String Quartet, and it is not the function of Title VII to disturb any such obvious right. '24 Perhaps the best method
22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In Green, the Supreme Court announced rules governing burdens
of proof and presumptions in private suits under Title VII. In order to make out a prima facie
case, the plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a protected class, such as a particular sex; (2)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that the position remained open after his
rejection, and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of the plaintiff's
qualifications. Id. at 802. The burden then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection. Id. In the event that such a showing can be made, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the reason given by the employer was a mere
pretext for sex discrimination. Id. at 804.
23. 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCIUMINATION § 50.21(a), at 10-151.
24. Id. § 50.21(c), at 10-160.
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for demonstrating the qualifications required is to utilize the qualifications
of others who have been accepted for the position involved. For example, a
female lawyer rejected by a Wall Street law firm could make a prima facie
case by showing that males with lower grades from the same school and
lower LSAT scores were hired by the firm. 25 The burden then shifts under
the McDonnell Douglas formula to the employer, who must prove a nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the female plaintiff. Courts generally
accord considerable latitude for professional judgment to employers in such
a situation when weighing the intangible qualities of the plaintiff against
whatever standards have been set. 26 Using the same Wall Street law firm
hypothetical, the firm could meet its burden of proof by arguing that
plaintiff's "writings were superficial, her personal interviews unimpressive,
her academic record more that of a bookworm than of a promising practitioner, and her general prospects of becoming the kind of lawyer this firm
needs for its particular kind of practice not good." 27 The plaintiff would
then be given the opportunity, under the McDonnell Douglas formula, to
show that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason was a mere pretext. She
might, for example, make use of statistics revealing a suspiciously small
employees in relation to the available supply of
proportion of female
28
qualified persons.
While this review of Employment Discrimination has thus far been
confined to the positive aspects of the treatise, one criticism is in order. A
conspicuous weakness of the treatise is the lack of coverage given by
Professor Larson to discrimination in federal employment. 29 Title VII was
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197230 to reach
federal employees who are discriminated against. The number of EEOC
suits on federal district court dockets in the area of federal employment is a
strong indication of the growing importance of this amendment. There is a
need for a comprehensive treatment of the special problems encountered
under federal employment discrimination laws, a need which Employment
Discriminationunfortunately does not meet. For example, the procedures
which federal employees must follow in order to obtain an agency-level
adjudication of discrimination claims are entirely different from the proce25.

See id. § 50.22(a), at 10-163.

26. See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v. Board of
Regents, 474 F.2d 594, 596 (5th Cir. 1973).
27. 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.22(a), at 10-163.
28. There are problems involved, however, in using statistics to prove pretextuality. For
example, what constitutes the available supply of qualified persons? See generally id. §
50.23(b).
29. Professor Larson's book contains a short section on "Public Employment Remedies
Under Federal Law." Id. § 63.00. The brevity of this section precludes an adequate treatment
of the complex area of federal employment discrimination.
30. Act of Mar. 24,1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111 (codified at42U.S.C. §2000e-16
(Supp. IV 1974)).
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dures followed by an individual in the private sector. Numerous other
important procedural and substantive questions in the federal employment
sphere remain unanswered. Undoubtedly, Professor Larson will treat extensively the aspect of employment in the federal sector in future supplements
to Employment Discrimination.
IV.
Employment Discriminationis a valuable addition to the field of labor
law. In terms of clarity of thought and completeness in coverage, the treatise
is unrivaled. The aspiration of every author is to produce a living creationa work that will transcend the printed page, consist of more than the sum
total of its chapters, and bring enjoyment and knowledge to future generations of readers. That aspiration has been achieved by very few authors of
legal treatises; the Willistons and Wigmores of this life are few and far
between. It appears that in the case of Professor Larson, the goal has been
realized. From the perception of the active labor bar, Mr. Larson's contribution to the field of employment discrimination is great indeed. His treatise is
a genuinely useful tool for the practitioner, and it represents a solid contribution to legal scholarship.

